Neoliberalism, Global Justice, and Transnational Feminisms

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The processes collectively referred to as “globalization” have shifted our moral and political landscape. The transnational flow of ideas, people, and capital that began during the colonial period continues at an unprecedented speed. Neoliberalism, a school of economic thought that favors deregulation of markets and privatization of social services, drives international trade and development agendas. This has produced new vulnerabilities and contributed to existing ones. According to the World Bank, 700 million people live in extreme poverty (earning less than $1.90 a day) (Cruz, et al. 2015). In the last five years, the wealth of the poorer half of the world’s population has fallen by almost 40% (Oxfam 2016). Almost a quarter of the GDP of poor countries is owed as external debt (MDG Task Force 2015).

Many contemporary forms of deprivation are poorly understood without attention to gender and race. Women are especially vulnerable to poverty because environmental degradation and economic liberalization increase their unpaid work burdens (Jaggar 2013b), they are less likely to own assets, and because they are more likely to engage in precarious employment with no cash returns (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2010). New cross-border markets place specific labor demands on women of color. Women constitute the vast majority of the garment labor force (International Labor Organization 2014). They are often targeted for gendered
reasons—such as that they are less likely to unionize. Sex trafficking is increasing, especially in outsourcing and processing zones created by “free trade” (O'Brien 2008/9). Transnational labor flows have also altered patterns of the distribution of care and domestic work, creating what Rhacel Salazar Parrenas calls a “three-tier” transfer in which the public sphere labor of women in rich countries is sustained by immigrant women who leave their own children behind with women who are too poor to migrate (Salazar Parrenas 2000).

Feminist philosophies of global justice, like all philosophies of global justice, develop normative frameworks for evaluating and responding to practices that cross national borders. Characteristic of feminist approaches is an insistence that evaluating the effects of globalization requires attention to social and structural hierarchies. These social and structural hierarchies include, but are not limited to, sexist and racist oppression, colonialism, and cultural domination. It is striking that, in a world where women’s susceptibility to poverty is far greater than men’s, that the vast majority of the philosophical literature on global justice makes no mention of women or gender.

I focus in this chapter on another characteristic feature of feminist philosophies of global justice—their emphasis on questions that arise out of practices, especially practices of transnational movement-building. In their orientation toward political praxis, many feminist philosophies of global justice belong to the realm of what Charles Mills refers to as nonideal theory. Nonideal theory attempts to “cope with injustices in our current world and move to something better” (Anderson 2010, 3) rather than develop an idealized vision of a just world. Feminist philosophies of global justice respond to the
needs of a world that is, in Chandra Mohanty’s words, “only definable in relational terms, a world traversed with intersecting lines of power and resistance, a world that can only be understood in terms of its destructive divisions of gender, color, class, sexuality, and nation, a world that must be transformed through a necessary process of ‘pivoting the center’” (Mohanty 2005).

Feminist philosophers expand the set of questions raised by prevailing liberal theories of global justice. The latter have focused on identifying duties to the global poor and developing principles of justice for the global order. Feminist philosophers add questions that arise out of real-world difficulties recognizing and rectifying cross-border injustices, such as, “What types of processes are appropriate to developing normative goals across differences of culture and power?" “What kinds of representations of “others” prevent Northerners from perceiving their own responsibilities?” and “What can we learn about justice from social movements?” In what follows, I describe three concerns of feminist philosophies of global justice that demonstrate a commitment to analyzing political practices under nonideal conditions. I use the term ‘feminist philosophies’ broadly and include normative insights from interdisciplinary feminist theory.

**Relational Understandings of Harm and Responsibility**

Many feminist philosophers criticize individualistic approaches to diagnosing and rectifying harm. Rather than denying that individual humans can be loci of harm and reparation, they argue that we cannot see many injustices without looking at at patterns of relationship. Following Iris Young, feminist philosophers argue that many emerging
practices are harmful insofar as they establish certain relational patterns—not merely insofar as they cause suffering to individuals or distribute goods unfairly (Young 1990). According to Ofelia Schutte, for instance, neoliberal economic policies that pressure women to migrate to the United States have caused a “care deficit” in Latin America (Schutte 2003). As I will discuss in more depth in the last section, Alison Jaggar points out a need to recognize that the unpaid labor of women in the global South is effectively subsidizing the lifestyle of those in the affluent North (Jaggar 2013). I argue that a transnational surrogacy industry wherein South Asian women gestate babies for Northerners, promotes recognition harms to women of a color as a group. It perpetuates a global view of women of color as unentitled to have their own children, capable of producing only inferior, commodified forms of affect (Khader 2013). A distinctive moral epistemological shift underlies this focus on unjust patterns of relationship. Recognizing these patterns requires looking at multiple interactions and how actors are reconfigured relative to one another through these interactions—or what Fiona Robinson call “the permanent background of interaction.” Robinson suggests that a feminist moral epistemology would recommend a distinctive approach to poverty alleviation, one that focused on long-term connections between people in the global North and South rather than isolated charity. Such an approach would lead, in the long term, not only to ending poverty, but ending domination (Robinson 1999: 153).

*Institutional Rather than Individualist Approaches.* When feminists ask us to turn our moral attention to relations and contexts, they often mean *institutional* contexts—not just relations among “private” actors like citizens of the North and the “global poor.” Many of
the earliest feminist interventions into the global justice literature rejected what might be called the “moral methodological individualism” of mainstream philosophical approaches. By “moral methodological individualism,” I mean the view that rectifying injustice is primarily the responsibility of individual actors. The watershed article in Anglo-American global ethics, Peter Singer’s “Famine, Affluence, and Morality” (1972) analogized the relationship between people in the North and the global poor to the relationship between a passerby and a drowning child. Uma Narayan argues that the methodologically individualist emphasis ignores the role Northern corporations, states, and development actors actually promote poverty in the global South (Narayan 2005). According to Hye-Ryoung Kang, even state-focused understandings of transnational justice are insufficiently institutional. International institutional practices, such as International Monetary Fund-imposed Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) have required Southern states to decrease spending on health and education (more discussion of these in the third section). According to Kang, we cannot morally evaluate these effects on women by looking at the actions of states alone (Kang 201: 42).

According to feminist philosophers, existing patterns of domination matter to determining who owes what to whom and why. Jaggar, Diana Meyers, Shelley Wilcox, and Young independently argue that Northerners incur special obligations to women in the global South because of existing institutional relationships. Among the institutional harms Jaggar mentions are SAPs, unfair trade agreements (wherein, for example, Southern countries must weaken labor regulations), and militarism (Jaggar 2001; Jaggar 2002; Jaggar 2005a; Jaggar 2005b; Jaggar 2009). These cause gender-based harms
beyond poverty. For example, military bases increase the demand for sex work. Jaggar argues that Northern feminists should make reforming these institutional relationships a high priority goal, both because Northern countries cause harm through them, and because international institutions are more likely to listen to the voices of Northerners than poor women in the global South (Jaggar 2005b). Similarly, Wilcox develops a Global Harm Principle, according to which agents who harm others must stop harming them immediately and provide reparation. Using the example of Agent Orange in the Vietnam War, Wilcox argues that Northern-caused human rights deficits in the global South that can trigger a reparative duty to admit immigrants (Wilcox 2007: 277). Where Jaggar and Wilcox argue that institutionally-caused harms trigger reparative duties, other feminists develop institutional understandings of obligation that do not rely on historical claims about harm. Meyers argues that Northerners have special moral obligations to trafficked women because Northern governments “provide strong markets for sex work and little deterrent to sex traffickers” (Meyers 2016). Young argues against a “liability model” of responsibility in general (Young 2006). According to Young, it is difficult to isolate an agent—even a collective agent—that is causally responsible for global poverty, and inequalities within Northern counties dictate that not all Northern agents are equally responsible. However, because of the existing social and institutional connections, Northerners bear forward-looking responsibilities engage in collective action.

Relational Notions of Duty, Harm, and Repair

Other feminists take more metaphysical forms of social embeddedness to be morally significant. Sarah Clark Miller argues for a “global duty to care.” This duty
differs from Kantian duties, because it takes human interdependence, rather than the ability of each human person to reason, as foundational (Miller 2011: 41). Some feminists, especially care ethicists, argue that obligation itself—and not merely obligations to rectify global injustice—arise from relationships. Virginia Held argues that, even if individual human beings are locuses of moral worth, we should think of caring relationships as “normatively prior” to individual rights. According to her, respect for individuals can only be actualized in contexts where caring relations are sustained.

Feminist philosophers also envision the types of relationships that would prevail under a more just global order. Part of this task is, of course, envisioning more just institutional structures. For instance, Gillian Brock advocates reforming the international tax regime in ways that promote gender equality (2014). However, many argue that sustaining just institutions requires more-- in Ann Ferguson’s words, fostering “felt senses of community or publics when they don’t initially exist” (Ferguson 2011: 232; Held 2005: 102). In this vein, Held argues that creating and sustaining caring relations across borders is more important for ending human rights abuses than enforcing international law. Her point is not that international law lacks value, but rather that proclamations do little in the absence of relationships that ground genuine concern for specific distant others (Held 2005: 166). Kang argues that cross-border women’s movements, such as the Central American Network of Women in Solidarity with Maquila Workers, play a crucial role in moving toward a more just global order; they allow women to theorize and act against new forms of vulnerability in ways that national-level associations do not (Kang 2014: 54-56). Breny Mendoza, however, argues that the focus
on transnational-level associations privileges the concerns of elite women in the global South (Mendoza 2002). Feminists have also envisioned new forms of relationship for international development practice that that take seriously power differences between practitioners and intended beneficiaries (Ferguson 1998; Cudd 2005; Jaggar 2006; Tobin 2009; Khader 2010; Khader 2011; Rivera 2011; Tobin and Jaggar Forthcoming).

Feminists have also developed relational conceptions of harm and repair. Drawing on narratives from victims and activists responding to the Darfur genocide, Miller argues that the genocidal rape causes a distinctive type of harm. It impairs the victim’s community standing, impairs her relationships with others, and harms her community as well as her (Miller 2009). Using on Margaret Urban Walker’s work on moral repair (Walker 2006), Alisa Carse and Lynne Tirrell argue that forgiving very grave wrongs, such as the wrongs of genocide, requires extended processes of reclaiming moral authority and resituating one’s self understanding in relation to both the perpetrator(s) and one’s community(Carse and Tirrell 2010). Eva Feder Kittay argues that what she calls the “global heart transplant” wherein women from the global South migrate to care for children in the North must be understood as a harm to a relationship between caregivers and their children and children. Filipina domestic workers in the United States see their migration to the United States as undermining forms of care they wish they could offer their own children (Kittay 2008: 156).

**Naturalized Approaches to Normative Frameworks**
In addition to beginning from existing unjust practices, many feminists demonstrate
nonideal theoretical commitments by taking a naturalized moral epistemological
approach. In her ground-breaking *Moral Understandings*, Walker argues that morality
itself should be understood as a set of social practices (Walker 2007). Developing
Walker’s argument, Jaggar describes feminist ethics as naturalized in the same sense that
certain approaches to epistemology are naturalized; rather than positing that inquiry
occurs in a “pure” form uncontaminated by social practices, inquiries themselves are
subject to analysis as social phenomena (Jaggar 2000: 457). Naturalists see empirical
knowledge as relevant to normative inquiry. An important upshot is that the normative
frameworks can be assessed in terms of their practical effects. Contemporary feminist
approaches to global justice take into account the way theoretical approaches to global
justice continue gender, colonial, racist, and class domination. The point of naturalized
approaches is not to do away with normativity; feminists cannot do without concepts like
justice and harm. Instead, moral and political philosophy should not ignore the effects of
concepts and discourses on the world.

*The Moral Graphics of Global Justice*

Feminist philosophers argue that what Walker calls the “moral graphics” of
discussions of global justice affect our perceptions of what we owe to one another. For
example, Scott Wisor rejects Singer’s aforementioned analogy of the global poor to
children drowning in a pond on the grounds that it encourages harmful interventions.
Singer’s analogy, and the utilitarian reasoning behind it, suggest that people should
intervene in whatever way is most likely to be efficacious. According to Wisor, this in
turn suggests that it is easy to know whether aid is harming or helping and promotes a focus away from long-term solutions and institutional reform (Wisor 2011, 24; see also Kuper 2002).

Another moral graphical frame challenged by feminists depicts “other” women as victims of especially brutal cultures. This frame interweaves normative and non-normative assumptions. In her classic *Dislocating Cultures*, Narayan argues that the idea that injustices toward “other” women are culturally caused prevents Westerners from perceiving their role in these injustices. The practice of sati in India (ritualized widow immolation), widely perceived as an “indigenous” practice, became more prominent because of the British colonial fascination with it. The colonial construction of new gender roles and/or heightening of sexist oppression did not only occur in India (Narayan 1997; Lugones 2010; Nzegwu 1995, 2006; Whyte 2013). This culture-focused moral graphical frame misassigns moral responsibility, first by preventing Westerners from perceiving remedial responsibility they incur because of their causal roles in sexist oppression of “other” women. Second, as Jaggar argues, it causes Westerners to weight their moral responsibilities inappropriately—a preoccupation with burqas or female genital mutilation conveniently distracts from other very severe harms they cause, such as militarism and poverty (Jaggar 2005). Third, it may lead to development interventions that villainize “other” men do not rectify colonial and economic injustices to men and burden “other” women with sole responsibility to improve their societies (Chant 2006; Narayan 2010; Khader 2016).
Fourth, the view of “other” women’s oppression as culturally caused may suggest that eradicating their cultures is a solution. This has been a common criticism of Susan Moller Okin’s influential work on feminism and multiculturalism. Though Okin explicitly argues for cultural reform over destruction, she also writes that some women might be better off if “their cultures became extinct” (Okin 1999: 22). Two distinct worries have stemmed from the potential recommendation that other cultures should be eradicated. One is that it promotes marginalization of immigrant communities living in the West (Spinner-Halev 2001; Deveaux 2007; Phillips 2009). Another is that it makes Western militarism appear morally necessary. The idea that “other” cultures needed to be eradicated because of how they treat their women was widespread during the Victorian period and revived with the so-called war on terror (Grewal 1996).

Recent feminist work on Muslim women is an important locus of feminist theoretical attention to the moral graphics of global justice. Images of Muslim women as oppressed by a backward, medieval culture are ubiquitous in the post-September 11 West (Razakh 2008). Rhetorical justifications of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq portrayed freedom from culture as necessary for women’s liberation. In Europe and Canada, the values of both freedom and secularism are routinely evoked to justify policies that marginalize Muslims, such as the banning of Mosques and Muslim women’s forms of modest dress. Though many liberals would reject these policies, many justifications of such policies involve plausible interpretations of liberal values. For instance, some justify bans on veiling by portraying public exposition of one’s body as an enactment of freedom (Abu-Lughod 2002; Mahmood 2005) or by claiming that religion threatens the
democratic public sphere (Oliver 2010; Scott 2010). Responding to such political effects of certain forms of liberalism has led feminist philosophers to argue against certain ostensibly liberal commitments (Hirschkind and Mahmood 2002; Laborde 2008; Razack 2008; Khader 2016). For instance, Sherene Razack argues that religion became a racial dogwhistle in Canadian debates about faith-based arbitration (Razack 2008). I argue that this work on the moral graphics surrounding Muslim women should be viewed as an invitation to question the normative importance of freedom from tradition to feminism (Khader 2016; Weir 2013). I argue that feminism as a normative doctrine does not require the view that traditional dictates are inherently oppressive.

Connection to Cross-Border Movements and Practices

Feminist philosophers also demonstrate a naturalized and nonideal approach to ethics by approaching transnational movements as sites of normative inquiry. Ofelia Schutte uses Latin American social movements to argue that the ideal of women’s independence promoted by neoliberalism is deeply self-contradictory. It purports to increase women’s ability to pursue education, participation in public life, yet at the same time makes them dependent by cutting social supports for care work. For Schutte, this contradiction suggests a need to recognize that what neoliberalism calls “freedom” may not be freedom at all. Jaggar (2001) argues that the women’s human rights movement is a site of the creation of new norms. According to Jaggar, feminist human rights arguments have brought forward important questions regarding the relationships between first-generation (so-called “liberty”) rights and second-generation (“social”) rights. They
show how women cannot attain the objects of first-generation rights unless their societies secure second-generation ones.

Feminist philosophers, often responding to the needs of activists, also work to correct theoretical gaps in human rights discourse. Meyers responds to advocacy discourses about sex trafficking in her work on victim narratives and human rights. According to Meyers, many difficulties in victim advocacy arise partly from a legal and cultural association of victimhood with the lack of agency. As she puts it, “an undocumented transnational migrant’s fate hangs on whether that individual is deemed an agent or a victim of the transport process” (Meyers 2014: 10). Women who collaborate with their traffickers (a large number of those trafficked) have difficulty making legal claims, because they lack the passivity associated with victimhood—even though many experience “slavery-like conditions” and severe physical and psychological trauma.

Serena Parekh notices a different theoretical gap in human rights practice. The absence of an understanding of the relationship between gender and injustice has made it difficult to win asylum cases on grounds of gender-based persecution. In cases of domestic violence and rape, it is often argued that the state can protect women. According to Parekh, the idea of structural injustice both makes sense of why states often do not protect women when they can and explains why this failure is an issue for justice (Parekh 2012: 277).

A second element of the feminist view of social movements and practices as sites of normative inquiry is a methodological commitment to seeing women in the global South as theorizers. Many feminist philosophers argue that theorizing about “other” women treats them as “raw data” (Nnaemeka 2004), and this produces normative and
non-normative distortions. This point has been particularly important in discussions of how to measure and respond to poverty. Feminists have long been attentive to the ways in which concepts of deprivation can further marginalize the deprived—particularly when those concepts are formulated without their input. For example, the idea that dependency work is inherently mindless and degrading has perpetuated stereotypes of women as irrational. Though there is disagreement about the role and extent of involvement, there is broad agreement among feminist philosophers on the idea that the perspectives of women in the global South are key to developing measures of deprivation and implementing them (Nzegwu 1995; Ferguson 1998; Ackerly 2000; Nussbaum 2001; Nnaemeka 2004; Jaggar 2006; Charusheela 2008; Khader 2011a; Khader 2011b; Jaggar 2013a; Khader 2015). One reason for the insistence on what are often called “pro-poor methodologies” is prudential. People’s lives go worse when they are subject to misguided attempts to “develop them,” and as Jaggar puts it, “poverty is a stigmatizing term” (2013a: 6). To call someone “poor” in our current global order is to make them a legitimate target of certain social policies—policies that may worsen their lives and/or that they themselves may find objectionable. Consider one of the most controversial feminist philosophical claims about poverty—Martha Nussbaum’s claim that literacy is a basic capability to which everyone should have access (Nussbaum 2001). Nussbaum’s basis for this claim is that literacy is important for political participation and access to income. As Brooke Ackerly (2005), Nkiru Nzegwu (1995), and S. Charusheela (2008) have all argued, Nussbaum’s claim about the instrumental value of literacy varies in truth from context to context. That is, whether literacy secures these other functionings depends on certain context-variant facts
about how income and power can be accessed (Nzegwu 1995; Ackerly 2000; Charusheela 2008). Ackerly argues that, in rural Bangladesh, literacy just is not that important to the types of jobs that women need to gain a basic income. Nzegwu argues that focusing on literacy in certain sub-Saharan African contexts is likely to further the marginalization of women who are not from the upper classes. Charusheela interprets Nzegwu as claiming that the assumption that literacy is a requirement for power facilitates upper-class women’s exclusion of lower-class women from leadership positions in Igbo society. She also argues that it causes illiterate women to see themselves as lesser and accept domination by women from the other classes (Charusheela 2008: 8-9).

Though it might be argued that expanding literacy would reduce domination of non-elite women, Charusheela’s point is that policies that advance literacy are not neutral among ways of life. Literacy is more important to securing other goods within certain class and cultural contexts, and taking literacy promotion supports making to cultural contexts of poor rural women more like those contexts—and not vice versa. Some arguments against methodologies for diagnosing deprivation that originate from “above” also point to deeper metaethical issues making judgments across difference. For instance, it is a consequence of the view of morality as a social practice that values may not always be translatable from context to context. See Tobin and Jaggar in this volume for further discussion of the relationship of the nonmodularity of moral knowledge to global justice.

**Feminized Labor as A Justice Concern**
Feminist philosophers also demonstrate a nonideal theoretical orientation to global justice by calling for renewed moral and political attention to labor. On one hand, attention to what counts as labor and its distribution among social groups is a classic feminist concern, especially in socialist feminism. Feminists argue that dependency/care work, housework, and sex work maintain unjust power relations. On the other hand, the renewed emphasis on labor directly reflects the embeddedness of feminist theory in contemporary social movements and practices. Chandra Mohanty argues that changes in the material conditions of women’s lives in recent years justify a shift in philosophical attention. Her 1991 “Under Western Eyes,” perhaps the most influential essay in third-world feminist theory, concentrated on cultural imperialism. In the intervening years, according to Mohanty, neoliberalism created new forms of gender and racial oppression and has fomented the view that unregulated capitalism is both “natural” and normatively justified. In the words of Mohanty’s 2008 essay, “Under Western Eyes Revisited, “global political and economic processes have become more brutal, exacerbating economic, racial, and gender inequalities, and thus they need to be demystified, re-examined, and theorized” (Mohanty 2008: 230; see also Schutte 2000; Weir 2008; Ruiz-Aho 2011).

*New Forms of Gendered, Racialized Labor*

Feminist philosophers analyze the resultant forms of gendered, racialized vulnerability. For instance, Vandana Shiva argues that the spread of genetically modified organisms has marginalized poor farmers, who are often women, all over the world (Mohanty 2008: 230). Neoliberal globalization has also made women, and especially women of color, the
preferred workforce in “‘flexible, temporary’” labor markets (Mohanty 2008: 232). Some of the gendered and racialized occupations in this new disposable economy are sweatshop labor (women are more “docile” and can be paid less (Mohanty 2008: 246; Ong 1987), the international “maid [and nanny] trade,” and reproductive and sex tourism. Further, the international economic policies initially adopted as part of SAPs continue to increase women’s unpaid labor burdens. SAPs were a package of conditions poor countries must meet to receive IMF loans. These conditions included privatization, currency devaluation, and cuts in social expenditures. Such policies have forced women to perform unpaid labor to fill in the gaps in care for children, the elderly, and the disabled. The environmental effects of such policies have also increased women’s unpaid labor, since women are traditionally tasked with collecting firewood and water (Desai 2002). Moral and political questions about feminized and racialized forms of labor under neoliberalism align with an analytical paradigm recently developed in interdisciplinary Women’s Studies, transnational feminisms. Transnational feminist theorists emphasize the ways in which globalization, in its economic, military, and political forms, creates both impediments and opportunities for transnational feminist solidarity.

Feminists have also engaged in constructing philosophical frameworks for assessing injustices enacted through labor. Jaggar (2009) offers the notion of “transnational cycles of gendered vulnerability” to criticize the effects of the global economy on women in the global South. Jaggar states that interlocked global and local cultural processes make some people especially vulnerable to abuse, violence, and exploitation. The targeting of certain people for such heightened vulnerability is a distinct
moral and political problem. According to Jaggar, recognizing this requires going beyond Rawlsian approaches to distributive justice that insist we must be able to identify the “least well-off.” In another constructive approach to labor, Wisor extends arguments about what has come to be known as “the resource curse” to include gender impacts. The term “resource curse” describes a difficulty facing many resource-rich countries. The presence of desirable resources creates incentives for other nations to plunder them, and/or make deals with authoritarian political actors to access the resources. Wisor argues that we must take gender impacts into account to morally evaluate the resource curse. The labor impacts of the resource curse can adversely affect gender equality; for instance, oil production prevents the establishment of a highly developed service sector and thus reduces the likelihood that women will participate in the workforce (Jaggar 2009). In addition to offering gender-sensitive frameworks for normatively evaluating the impacts of gendered labor, Jaggar and Wisor offset the tendency to assume that “other” women’s oppression is simply “culturally caused” and/or that changing local cultural norms is the highest moral priority.

*Renewed Interest in Exploitation*

Feminist philosophical discussions of gendered labor have also led to a revival of interest in the concept of exploitation. Where discussions of exploitation in Anglo-American philosophy in the last thirty years have been largely restricted to “taking unfair advantage of a situation” over “taking advantage of an unfair situation,” feminist philosophers increasingly recognize a need to describe unfair situations as themselves exploitative. Jaggar argues that gendered time-use disparities can only be morally understood within
an exploitation framework. We need to understand poor Southern women’s nearly endless and increasing work burdens as both coerced and benefitting not only men, but private employers and state institutions (Jaggar 2013). Sylvia Chant argues that international development policy has created a “feminization of responsibility” in which women’s unpaid labor is a vehicle for the development of their countries (Chant 2006). I draw on Chant’s work to argue that the feminization of responsibility constitutes exploitation, because it shifts an obligation of people in the global North onto women in the global South (Khader 2015). Agomoni Ganguli (Ganguli forthcoming) and Monique Deveaux (2016) argue that cross-border markets in reproductive labor require an analysis of structural injustice as producing exploitation. Understanding the moral dimensions of transnational surrogacy requires attention to the ways in which legal structures protecting surrogates have been responsive to international financial pressures (Ganguli 2016). According to Deveaux, brokers in markets for ova who pay women less than is required to meet their needs take advantage of the economically vulnerable in ways that constitute exploitation (2016). The notion of exploitation as mere extraction of an unfair price fails to capture the ways in which women who “donate” eggs are being used because of their economic need.

Though she does not explicitly use an exploitation framework, Narayan argues that microcredit conscripts women into reproducing a colonial economic system that is ultimately bad for them and their states. Though celebratory development discourses paint microcredit as “entrepreneurship” that empowers women, most microcredit initiatives encourage women to operate in the informal economy. Not only does the
informal economy provide women with few workplace protections or opportunities for advancement, the informal economy is, by definition, not taxed. External encouragement of untaxable forms of labor encourages continued poor country dependence on rich countries and makes it difficult for poor countries to provide social services to their citizens.

**Conclusion**

Feminist philosophical approaches to globalization often begin from nonideal theoretical commitments. They often begin from an analysis of the real-world problems wrought by neoliberalism and maintain an active dialogue with social movements attempting to respond to those problems. This continued dialogue with political practices has produced heightened attention to the political effects of academic and advocacy discourses, as well as attention to the processes by which deprivation and oppression are generated and diagnosed. It has offered reasons to change intellectual priorities as real world political realities shift as the shift from the focus on “cultural” oppression of women to transnational flows of feminized labor suggests. Feminist approaches have also highlighted the multidimensional character of oppression and deprivation; political responses to our current transnational landscape must take into account disparities besides poverty, such as gendered and racialized vulnerabilities.

*See also* Critical race theory, intersectionality, and feminist philosophy (Chapter 29); Women, gender, and philosophies of global development (Chapter 34); Feminist
intersections with environmental and ecological thought (Chapter 35); Moral justification in an unjust world (Chapter 40); Feminist ethics of care (Chapter 43); Multicultural and postcolonial feminisms (Chapter 47); Feminism, structural injustice, and responsibility (Chapter 49); Latin American feminist ethics and politics (Chapter 50).

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